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THE MAINTENANCE OF UNIFORM RESALE PRICES.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Bauer v. O'Donnell,' more familiarly known as the
Sanatogen Case, has occasioned much discussion of the subject-
of "price maintenance". This discussion has centered around the
power of the pioducer of a patented, copyrighted, or trade-
marked article legally and effectively to establish at successive
stages the resale price of his product, even to the extent of nam-
ing the sum to be received by the retailer in the final transfer to
the consumer.
In considering this question of resale price maintenance it is
necessary to understand exactly what is meant by the various
terms, "fixed prices", $(price maintenance", "one price to all",
"standardization of prices", etc., freely and often indiscriminately
used in discussions of this subject. As the "price maintenance"
cause has been greatly harmed by the indiscriminate use of these
terms to express the same idea-the right of a manufacturer to
designate and control the resale prices of his article,--at the
outset we should clearly distinguish between price fixing by a
combination-whether of manufacturers or retailers is imma-
terial so far as the effect on the public is concerned-and price
maintenance by an individual producer in a competitive field.
The former is a violation of the ShermanAnti-Trust Law,2 if it
was not illegal at common law, and usually means monopoly. On
the other hand those who believe the recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court8 failed to interpret properly the business needs of
the country, are insistent that the right to enforce uniform resale
prices should be given only to the producer who is not allied with
any competitor in the manufacture or vending of his particular
line of goods. Recently the term "price standardization" has
been substituted for "price maintenance" because the latter term
' 229 U. S. 1. (May 26. 1913).
'Act of July 2, i89o, c. 647, 26 Stat. 2o9.
" Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss. 210 U. S. 339 (sgo8); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 37"3 (1911); and Bauer v. O'Donnell. 229
U. S. 1 (913).
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sounds as though this system of marketing merchandise involved
the holding up of prices, as though it meant high prices, when as
a matter of fact combinations and "price cutting" mean high
prices, while price maintenance means the lowest price consistent
with a living profit to each agent in the system of distribution.
And this standard price idea suggests the best purpose of uni-
form price advocates: their insistence upon one price to all, all
along the line. This means that the producer shall sell to all job-
bers at the same price per unit, regardless of the quantity bought;
that the large and small retailer will buy on exactly the same
terms; that the consumer can buy the article at a uniform price
throughout the country. It is submitted that this system of mer-
chandising completes the evolution of exchange from primitive
barter to the certainty and safety of modern purchase.
The introduction of money as the medium of exchange was
the first "great advance in trading. But buying and selling re-
mained a contest of wits; and the law looked on at the contest,
declaring solemnly and ominously "caveat emptor." The courts
said that reliance on "business talk" was unreasonable. The next
step in the development of fair selling was the "one price store",
with the price of each article plainly marked. But there was
still no standard of quality, and the few standard articles were
not sold at uniform prices; so the purchaser still had to rely on
his own acumen, or put his trust in the retailer; and the indi-
vidual manufacturer had little encouragement to establish or to
maintain a reputation. The ever present danger of the retailer's
abandoning their goods for inferior substitutes, to be sold at a
greater profit, led manufacturers to label their goods with their
trade names. Later the sale of trade-marked goods in their orig-
inal packages gave a guarantee of quality; but the standard of
value in retail trade was secured only when uniform retail prices
for branded goods became the general rule. And a bill is now
before Congress which, if passed, will put the stamp of legisla-
tive approval on the final step in this evolution; and the "one
price" ideal will be realized.'
'H. R. 133o5, introduced by Representative Stevens of New Hampshire,
provides that contracts prescribing the sole uniform price at which a trade-
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On account of the damaging effects of "price cutting",-
that is, featuring a well known brand at a sacrifice, of which
more will be said hereinafter,-m anufacturers and publishers
have sought to control the resale price of their product by notices
attached to each article,5 and by contracts with the trade. These
contracts are mainly of two types. In contracts of the first type
the manufacturer undei-akes to maintain a uniform price by
putting into effect what may be characterized as the "rebate
plan", whereby the producer promises to refund to dealers main-
taining the selling price fixed by him, a portion of the purchase
price paid by them. This, while operating as an inducement to
the dealer to resell only at the price named, in no way binds him
to do so. Up to the present time this type of contracts has been
uniformly upheld ;6 but judging from the recent decisions of the
marked or branded article may be resold are legal provided: (x) the pro-
ducer does not have a monopoly in the same general class of merchandise
as the article covered by the contract, and is not a party to any combina-
tion or agreement in regard to the sale prices of an article of the same
class: (2) the uniform retail price of such article is plainly marked thereon;
(3) the manufacturerfiles with the Bureau of Corporations a statement of
the prices to wholesalers, retailers, and consumers; and provided further
that there shall be no discrimination in favor of any vendee by way of allow-
ance. discount, concession, rebate, or commission for any cause; (4) an
article protected by such contract may be sold below the standard price (a)
when a dealer is retiring from business, or has become bankrupt, or when
his business is in the hands of a receiver, provided the vendor was given
an opportunity to repurchase the same at the price paid by the dealer; or
(b) if the article had become damaged or soiled, and the maker had declined
the offer to repurchase the goods; but in this case the goods must be plainly
marked damaged goods.
A somewhat similar bill was introduced by Representative Metz to apply
only to patented or copyrighted articles. But the Metz bill falls far short
of the one price to all ideal in that it allows a "quantity price" to the large
purchaser. Thus it would foster the mail order and chain store concerns,
who can buy in large quantities, with no corresponding benefit to the con-
suming public.
'In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U. S. 339 09o8). there was no
contract between the complainant and the defendants, but the latter, trading
as R. H. Macy & Co., purchased the novels with notice of the condition of
sale printed in each book, which provided that it could be resold only at a
stipulated price. The Court held that such notice was ineffectual as against
one not bound by contract or license agreement.
In Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene, 2o2 Fed. Rep. 225 (1913), the patentee
attached a similar tiotice to each watch movement. But Judge Ray held that
the complainant could not limit by contract or notice the resale price of its
product, because on the first sale of the article it received its full considera-
tion. On March 2, 1914, the Supreme Court refused a writ of certiorari it"
this case (23z U. S. 724).
'In re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104 (1894); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App.
602 (1885); Walsh v. Dwight, s8 N. Y. Supp. 91 0899); Park & Sons Co.
v. Nat. Wholesale Druggists' Assn., 175 N. Y. I (r9o3).
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Supreme Court, it would seem that all forms of contracts having
for their object the regulation of resale prices, win be declared il-
legal and unenforceable. And it is at once apparent that the re-
bate plan is only feasible where the manufacturer sells direct to
the retailer and on short terms of credit. Of the second type are
the various kinds of contracts employed in what may be described
as the "contract system". The wholesaler may agree with the
producer to supply the trade at a stipulated price; or the contract
may require the jobber to sell only to dealers approved by the
manufacturer, with whom the manufacturer contracts directly
that, in consideration of their being supplied with his product,
they will not sell below the standard retail price. In another form,
which, however, has been held only colorable,t the contract with
the wholesaler purports to make him a distributing agent for the
producer.
Before considering the arguments for and against standard
prices, it may be well to examine the authorities briefly, in order
to ascertain when and why this system of merchandising, which
has become so general and which meets the approval of ninety-
eight per cent. of all retail dealers8 and has won favor with the
purchasing public, was condemned by our highest judicial tri-
bunal. Prior to the decisions of the late Justice Lurton, then Cir-
cuit Judge, in Park v. Hartman,9 and Dr. Miles Medical Company
'See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 164 Fed. Rep. 803 (C C.
A. To8). However, the decisions so far seem to except from the general pro-
hibition of price maintenance the establishment of genuine selling agencies
whereby the sale of the article is controlled by the producer until it reaches
the ultimate user. Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene 202 Fed. Rep. 225 (1913).
But if future decisions follow the line along which the law in reference to
price maintenance has developed during the past three years, it is thought
that this exception will soon be brought within the general prohibition.
* In answer to the query whether dealers favored price standardization,
the Eastman Kodak Co. and A. J. Reach Co. received answers from over
ninety per cent. of the retailers carrying their goods, and in each case ninety-
eight per cent. voted for price maintenance. A similar census taken by the
Waterman Fountain Pen Co. showed ninety-eight and five-tenths per cent.
favoring that form of merchandising. Out of fourteen hundred and five replies
received by the Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co., to the same question, only
eight dealers were against the maintenance of uniform prices. And out of six
thousand votes cast by retail jewelers in the Hamilton Watch Co. poll,
there were only three opposed to theenforcement of standard prices.
* i53 Fed. Rep. 24 (C. C. A. i9o7).
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v. Park,10 the courts uniformly sanctioned price maintenance, up-
holding agreements to attain that end in law,"' and enforcing
them by injunctive relief against the recalcitrant price cutter in
equity. 2  This right was not limited to articles protected by the
copyright, patent, or trade-mark laws; it extended probably to all
articles,13 and certainly to "trade secret" products sold under a
trade name.' 4
The first case decided by the Supreme Court which ques-
tioned the right of a producer to control the resale price of his
article was Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Strauss,"5 in which the
Court held that the publisher of a copyrighted book could not con-
trol the retail price thereof by licensing it to be sold only at a cer-
tain price: that selling the book below the price set by the pub-
lishers was not an infringement of his copyright. In this case
the Supreme Court made a distinction between the patent statute
and the copyright act; and held that the right to vend given the
holder of a copyright did not include the right to determine the
price at which the future sales of the article could be made. This
distinction was wiped out in the recent case of Batter v. O'Don-
tcll,16 in which a majority of the Court held that where the pat-
'164 Fed. Rep. 8o3 (C. C A. igoB).
UGarst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72 (09oo) ; Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 6i1
(19o9).
. Miles v. Jayne. 149 Fed. Rep. 838 (z9o6); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Platt, 42 Fed. Rep. 6o6 (9o6); Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. I44 (i9o5);
Fowle v. Park, 13i O. S. 88 (1889).
And in Com. v. Grinstead, 63 S. W. Rep. 427 (19o), the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky held that price maintenance agreements did not violate
the criminal provisions of the so-called conspiracy or anti-trust statute.
" In Ice Co. v. Parker, 21 How. Pr. 302 (N. Y. 1861), the manufacturer
of ice was permitted to control the resale price of his product.
And see Hartman v. Park, x4s Fed. Rep. 358 (19o6).
"Jayne v. Loder, I49 Fed. Rep. 21 (C. C. A., 3d Cir., i9o6); Garst v.
Hall, 179 Mass. 588 (igor); Park & Sons Co. v. Nat. Wholesale Druggists'
Assn., 67 N. E. Rep. 136 (N. Y. i9o3) ; and cases cited in notes ix and t2,
supra.
210 U. S. 339 (i9o8). It is interesting to notice that this action for
an infringement of a copyright was against R. H. Macy & Co which firm
is now one of the leaders in the fight against standard prices. The position
of the large department stores, which are opposing the Stevens Bill, is set
forth in the statement of 'Mr. Percy Strauss of this firm, reported in the
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Represen-
tatives, 63d Congress, Second Session, on Trust Legislation, Serial 7, Part 25,
page r117 ef req.
"229 U. S. 1 (xg3).
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entee received the full consideration for his article in the sale to
the jobber, a retail "cut price" sale did not violate any rights
given the inventor by the patent laws; and that the manufacturer
could not control the resale price of his product by notice at-
tached thereto, nor by contract, such contracts being an illegal re-
straint of trade, and therefore void, at common law and under
the Sherman Act. It is submitted that in reaching this conclu-
sion the majority of the Court overruled the unanimous decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Betnent v. National Harrow
Company,17 and the spirit of the decision in Henry v. Dick."8 Al-
though the Bement Case has been distinguished in the recent de-
cisions upon the ground that the Court was there passing upon a
license to manufacture and sell, and that the sale-price agreement
was intended to preserve the patentee's royalty, there can be little
doubt that at the time the case was decided it purported to legalize
general price maintenance contracts on patented articles. That
it was so interpreted by the courts and the profession generally
2i 186 U. S. 70 (902). In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice
Peckham uses this language, at page 93:
"The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would sell the
article manufactured under the license, was also an appropriate and reason-
able condition. It tended to keep up the price of the implements manufac-
tured and sold, but that was only recognizing the nature of the property
dealt in and providing for its value as far as possible. This the parties were
legally entitled to do. The owner of a patented article can, of course, charge
such price as he may choose, and the owner of a patent may assign it or sell
the right to manufacture and sell the article patented upon the condition
that the assignee shall charge a certain amount for such article."
3224 U. S. I (1912). This case involved the right of a patentee to
restrict the make of articles that should be used with the machine sold. A
majority of the Court held the restriction valid on the ground that the
patentee had parted with a qualified property right in the article, although it
was conceded that except for the notice limiting the use to be made thereof,
the patentee had made an unconditional sale of the machine.
The majority .. as composed of Justices Lurton, McKenna, Holmes, and
Vandeventer; a strong dissent was written by Mr. Chief Justice White, in
which Justices Hughes and Lamar concurred. This case was argued after
the death of Mr. Justice Harlan, and during the absence of Mr. Justice Day.
After this decision, the case of Bauer v. O'Donnell was argued before a full
bench, Mr. Justice Pitney having been appointed to succeed Mr. Justice
Harlan. He and Mr. Justice Day concurred in the views expressed by the
Chief Justice in his dissenting opinion in the Dick case, and they with the
minority in the earlier case now became the majority, and the four Justices
who had prevailed in the Dick decision became the dissenters in the Sana-
togen Case. Thus it will be seen that the vote of one Justice made contracts
for price maintenance on patented articles illegal.
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is evidenced by all the cases which raised the question, 9 until the
decision in the Sanatogen Case.
One other decision of the Supreme Court should be noted to
get the Sanatogen Case in its proper setting. In 1911, in the case
of Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park and Sons Company,20 the
Court held that a system of contracts to maintain a uniform price
on a "trade secret" article, sold under a trade-mark, was in viola-
tion of the Sherman Law, and that such contracts were in re-
straint of trade and illegal at common law. The idea underlying
this decision seems to be that such contracts were an unwarranted
restraint upon alienation. But the true test by which the legality
of a contract requiring the purchaser to resell at a standard price
is to be determined is (i) whether the stipulation is of an anci-
lary nature; (2) whether it affords only a reasonable protection
to the business of the convenantee; and (3) whether such a stip-
ulation, considered with reference to the benefit to the public aris-
ing from the production of the article, as well as the detriment to
the public in being deprived of the benefit of free competition as
to the selling price, is, upon the whole, against public interest.
2 1
It is not the fact of restraint, but the degree of the restriction and
the reasonableness thereof, which will control ;22 and in the last
analysis the question as to the validity of a particular contract or
system of contracts will be found to be largely one of expedi-
ency.23 These common law principles are not peculiar to "trade-
secret" articles, but are equally applicable to any chattel property.
"Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. Rep. 424 (C. C. A.,
,th Cir., 1903) ; Winchester Arms Co. v. Buengar, gg Fed. Rep. 786 (D. C.,
Wis, 1912) ; National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed. Rep. 733 (C. C.
A., 8th Cir., i9o4); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works
Co, 154 Fed. Rep. 358 (C. C. A., 7th Cir., I9o7) ; Indiana Mfg. Co. -'. Nichols
& Shepard Co., i9o Fed. Rep. 579 (C. C, Mich., 1911); Automatic Pencil
Sharpener Co. v. Goldsmith Bros., i9o Fed. Rep. 2o5 (C. C., N. Y., 1911);
and see also Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24, at page 27, mentioned supro.
0 22o U. S. 373.
- Edgar Lumber Co. v. Cormie, i3o S. W. Rep. 452 (Ark. gio); Hub-
bard v. Miller. 27 Mich. i5 (1873); Roberts v. Lamont, 102 N. W. Rep. 770
(Neb. i9o5); Merriman v. Cover, 51 S. E. Rep. 817 (Va. i9o5); Horner v.
Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (Eng. 1831); Mandeville v. Harman, 7 Ati. Rep. 37 (N. J.
Eq. 1886).
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt & Co. fi9o4] A. C. 565; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 22r U. S. I (ifo i); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,
13 N. E. Rep. 419 (N. Y. 18 8 7.)..
"Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U1. S. 396 (i889).
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In deciding these price maintenance cases, therefore, the
c,,nrts are dealing with an economic rather than a legal question;
they are determining a question of public policy. That being the
case, it is worthy of notice that in England2 4 and Germany'-
the leading commercial countries of Europe--contracts having
for their purpose the maintenance of uniform selling prices are
sustained and enforced by the courts. In Denmark2" a section of
the statute dealing with unfair trade expressly forbids price cttt-
ting; and in this country the highest courts of two States2 T have
refused to follow the Supreme Court decisions; while in at least
one other State the Legislature has dealt with unfair competition
in terms broad enough to cover price cutting.25 And the Trade
Commission Act, recently passed by Congress, gives the Commis-
sion power to deal with this business evil.22  It would seem,
T Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Sons [i9o] 2 Ch. Div. 275;
National Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Co. [i9o8] r Ch. Div. 335. In
Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong, before Mr. Justice Atkin in the King's Bench
Div. at Manchester, not yet reported, the right of the plaintiff to maintain
its resale price was fully sustained; but only nominal damages were
awarded, as the court held that the stipulated damages were in the nature
of a penalty rather than liquidated damages. In a similar case, Dunlap Tire
Co. v. New Garage Co., not yet reported, decided July x, 1x4, the House of
Lords fully sustained the liquidated damage clause.
"Jandorf v. Incorporated Assn. of Manufacturers of Branded Articles,
Berlin Geschaftsummer 73.0, 179.o5, 48 vi. 489.06,
'Section 13 of an Act (No. 137) approved by King Christian X, June
8, 1912, provides: "It shall also be unlawful to sell or offer for sale at lower
prices goods in original package . . . upon which goods their fixed prices
for retail sale are stated, unless the sale falls under the provisions of sec-
tion 6." Section 6 refers to clearance sales of damaged goods, removal sales,
and the like; the condition being similar to the provisions of paragraph D
of the Stevens Bill now before Congress. See note 4, supra, clause (4).
Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, r28 Pac. Rep. xo4i (Cal. 1912); Fisher
Flour Milling Co. v. Swanson, 137 Pac. Rep. z44 (Wash. 1913).
'A New Jersey statute approved Apr. 1, 1913 (Chapter No. 21o. Laws
of 1913), makes it unlawful "for any merchant, firm or corporation, for the
purpose of attracting trade for other goods, to appropriate for his or their
own ends a name, brand, trade-mark, reputation, or good will of any maker
. . . or to discriminate against the same, by depreciating the value of such
products in the public mind, or by misrepresentation as to value or quality,
or by price inducement, or by unfair discrimination between buyers, or in
any other manner whatsoever; except in cases where said goods do not carry
any notice prohibiting such practice, and excepting in case of a receiver's
sale, or a sale by a concern going out of business."
* Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: "That unfair
methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful" The
Commission is given power to prevent unfair competition, and no attempt is
made to define the term; so the Act is broad enough to make illegal price
cutting that amounts to unfair trade.
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therefore, to be entirely proper to examine the reasons and the
principles of trade expediency on which the decisions are based, to
see if they agree with our ideas of commercial justice and fair
dealing.
The principal argument of those opposed to price mainte-
nance among retailers, in legislative committees, and on the bench,
is that after one has parted with title to an article, he should not
be allowed further to control it. That idea seems to underlie the
recent enunciations of the Supreme Court, mid has several times
been expressed by Chairman Clayton and Ex-Judge Floyd of the
Judiciary Committee of the Federal House of Representatives.
The fallacy in this argument is that the manufacturer's interest
in his product does not end with the transfer of title to the dealer,
but follows the article into the hands of the ultimate consumer
or user. His business life is dependent upon the public's being
able to buy his article everywhere at a uniform price, and always
of the same quality. Cut price sales will speedily and surely de-
crease the sale of his product; and if he is able to survive the loss
of business, the manufacturer will be forced to reduce the quality
of his article. One dealer advertising a so-called "cut price" sale
invariably causes other dealers to cut below him in retaliation,
with the result that all dealers in the community are forced to sell
the particular article at a price which yields no profit. It hardly
need be said they will not long continue to handle an article at a
loss; so the market for the article is killed in that community, not
because the people want the "just-as-good" substitute, nor be-
cause the quality of the article has been lowered, nor because the
standard price is exorbitant, but because a business parasite used
the good name of a popular article to deceive the. public into be-
lieving he sold everything below cost. It is to protect themselves
against the disastrous consequences of such predatory price-
cutting, which is little shoit .of unfair t-ade,30 that the producers,
wholesalers, and retailers 6f trade-nirked articles seek legisla-
"In an interesting article in a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review
(VoL 27, P. 139, December, 1913). Mr. Edward S. Rogers suggests that in
the extension of the law of unfair competition to include the suppression
of all deceptive artifices by which one trader's customers are transferred to
another, predatory price cutting ought to be included in that class of cases
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tive or judicial condemnation of such practices and the legaliza-
tion of resale price maintenance.
A later result of general price cutting is deterioration in the
quality of the slaughtered article. To get dealers to handle his
product, the manufacturer must lower the price to the trade.
Actual or potential competition prevents the uniform price from
being excessive, so a lower price to the jobber forces the maker to
lower the quality. Furthermore a reduction in the volume of bus-
iness, resulting from the loss of sales in localities where cut price
wars have been waged, increases the unit cost of production. So
the public suffers: either from not being able to buy this standard
article, which it has tried and found satisfactory; or if the article
is still on the market, the, quality is not there. In the final
analysis, therefore, price cutting of branded articles and price
maintenance vitally concern each one of us as a customer.
Another answer to this argument of the opponents of stand-
ard prices is that the first real sale is to the consumer. A manu-
facturer has not really sold his product when he has only trans-
ferred it to wholesalers, who have delivered it to retailers. If the
article goes no further, the manufacturer's business will be short
lived. The product of the maker's genius and enterprise is sold
for the first time when it is purchased by the consumer and stays
sold. The jobber and retailer, whether they work on commis-
sions or price differentials, are really agents of the manufacturer
-the channels of distribution from the work shop to the user.
The manufacturer's mark on the article is evidence that he stands
in which the courts have begun to enjoin acts of unfair trade not involving
the element of deception. Mr. Rogers shows that the essence of the injury
in unfair trade cases is not the deception of the public, but the damage to
the business of the producer, and the diversion of the fruits of his good will
from the creator of it to one who seeks to utilize it for his own benefit.
The injury to the fair name of an article and to the good will of the busi-
ness of its producer, resulting from price cutting, being clear, it is submitted
that the courts should grant relief against the dealer who slaughters a standard
price article for an ulterior purpose-to foist upon an over-credulous public
the unknown substitute, or to fool the public into believing that he under-
sells his competitors on all lines because he advertises a dollar watch for
sixty-nine cents. "Advertises" is used advisedly, for the cut-price parasite
usually has only a few of the standard articles used as a decoy. Neverthe-
less the injury to the manufacturer and other dealers is complete, for the
value of the sacrificed article is lowered in the mind of the purchasing public
to.the cut price, and legitimate dealers can no longer sell it at its regular
price.
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back of his product :31 it is the purchaser's guarantee of quality
and service.3 2  This surely is not sold to the middle man.
Back of the recent decisions forbidding price maintenance
contracts is the assumption that to allow producers to control re-
sale pr:ces would mean high prices, and the further assumption
that the public is benefited by price cutting. But, as suggested
above, when an individual manufacturer in a competitive market
establishes the price of his product, he does it at his peril-"the
peril that if he sets it too high, either the consumer will not buy
or, if the article is, nevertheless, popular, the high profits will in-
vite even more competition".3 8 This assumption seems to arise
from the confusion of price fixing by a monopoly, and price
maintenance by an individual producer in a competitive field, dis-
cussed above.
The assumption that the public gains by price cutting is over-
whelmingly negatived by our commercial experience. It is a
matter of common knowledge that the Oil and Tobacco Trusts
were intrenched by price cutting, used to kill off competitors;34
"It will not do to say that the manufacturer has not interests to pro-
tect by contract in the goods after he has sold them. They are personally
identified and morally guaranteed by his mark and his advertisement." Ellis,
J., in Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 137 Pac. Rep. 144 (Wash. 1913).
'To insure his customers getting what is commonly known as "service"--
which, on account of the impracticability of returning an article to the fac-
tory to have a small defect corrected, must be furnished by the local dealer,
and for which the retailer is compensated by part of his profit,-manufac-
turers should be allowed to control the resale price; for if a dealer has not
made a living profit on an article, lie cannot afford lo, and hence will not,
give this service which the maker guarantees.
See an interesting article from the pen of Mr. Louis D. Brandeis en-
titled "Cut-throat Prices-The Competition That Kills" in Harper's Weekly
for November i5, 1913.
U "One of the most effective means employed by the Standard Oil Com-
pany to secure and maintain the large degree of monopoly which it pos-
sesses, is the cut in prices to the particular customers, or in the particular
markets of its competitors, while maintaining them at a higher level else-
where." From the Report of Commissioner Herbert Knox Smith of the
Federal Bureau of Corporations.
In the article referred to in the last note Mr. Brandeis lays bare the
pit-falls of general price cutting in these words: "It [price cutting] has been
the most potent weapon of monopoly-a means of killing the small rival
to which the great trusts have resorted most frequently. It is so simple,
so effective. Far-seeing organized capital secures by this means the co-opera-
tion of the short-sighted unorganized consumer to his own undoing. Thought-
less or weak, he yields to the temptation of trifling immediate gain; and sell-
ing his birthright for a mess of pottage, becomes himself an instrument of
monopoly."
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just as the mail order houses and chain stores are killing the,
small merchants today. The result is clearly stated in the annual
report of Secretary of Commerce Redfield thus:
"Others say that the refusal to permit the fixing of retail
prices tends to monopoly, because in the cut-throat competition
certain to follow, obviously the stronger competitor will survive
and may eventually have the business in his own hands, for the
law forbids the making of agreements to maintain prices, and
under these circumstances the weakest must go to the wall."
But do not purchasers gain by the operations of a single
cut price dealer? In the language of the Supreme Court of
Washington, "it is a fallacy to assume that the price cutter as-
sumes and pockets the loss. The public makes it up on other pur-
chases". 3 5 The price cutter is not a philanthropist, lie is a rob-
ber, stealing the advertising and filching the good will of an-
other's product; and like all thieves he does not share his booty
with the public. "I cannot believe", said Mr. Justice Holmes in
his strong dissent in the Dr. Miles Case, "that in the long run the
public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable
prices for some ulterior purpose of their own, and thus to impair,
'if not destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is as-
sunmed to be desirable that the public should be able to get".A3
It is sometimes contended that to allow manufacturers. to
control the resale prices of their brands would mean less competi-
tion. But the competition we need in this country is competition
among manufacturers in the quality and price of their products;
'Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 137 Pac. Rep. 144 (Wash. 1913),
at page 151.
See also the statement of Mr. John Wanamaker before the Industrial
Commission: "I want to keep away from the store that tries to catch me with
that kind of a fish-hook. If they lose on one thing, they will put it on some-
thing else you don't know of. There are things purchasers aon't know any-
thing about." Report of Industrial Commission, Vol. 7, p. 465.
The evils of price cutting and the advantages of price standardization to
the consumer were forcefully stated before a Congressional Committee last
February by Mrs. Christine Frederick, consulting household editor of the
Ladies' Home journal, Philadelphia Public Ledger, and New York Sun,
and representative of the Housewives' League. See Report of Hearings
before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 62d
Congress, 2d Session, on Trust Legislation, Serial 7, Part 18, p. 725, for Mrs.
Frederick's statement.
"Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Park, 220 U. S. 373 (xx), at page 412.
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not the cut-throat competition among retailers, which the prohi-
bition of price maintenance has stimulated. A standard price and
national advertising tend to raise the quality of an article, and to
encourage competition. This fact seems to have been overlooked
by the Supreme Court, but it was emphasized by the Washington
State Court in a well considered case 7 upholding price mainte-
nance agreements on a special brand of flour. In its recent deci-
sions the Supreme Court has shown a desire to foster retail com-
petition. If this is the purpose of the Court, it is submitted that
price cutting will have just the opposite effect. In the past few
years the mail order houses and chain stores have eliminated
many thousands of retailers.3 8  And when they have completed
their work of killing off the small independent dealers, experience
has taught us that the prices fixed by these gigantic combinations
of capital will be high, for they will have no competitors. It
would seem, therefore, that the public has little to hope for from
the present developments of retail competition. And it is a
healthy sign to see the large manufacturers of standard brands
fightingthe-battle of the small retailers for their very existence.
Charles L. Miller.
Lancaster, Pa.
"Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 137 Pac. Rep. z44 (1913).
In a recent speech in the United States Senate Senator Lippitt, of
Rhode Island, quoted figures to show the astonishing growth of the business
of these enterprises, until today one Chicago mail order house does an annual
business of close to $ioo,oooooo; and last year the sales of a chain of
five-and-ten-cent stores reached the amazing total of $66,ooo,ooo. "Where has
that business come from? It has come from the small storekeepers and the
people engaged in moderate-sized business all over the United States." Extract
from Congressional Record of August $, 1914.
In Philadelphia statistics show that the grocery business is being speedily
monopolized by chain stores. Notwithstanding the growth of the city, there
are today less than one-half the number of grocery stores that there were five
years ago. It is believed that statistics in all the principal cities would show
a similar decrease in the number of retail drug, cigar, and grocery stores.
